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Abstract 
In summer, 2003, roughly half of Louisiana cattle producers had never heard of the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program.  Those who had heard of it and had applied 
for funds were more diversified, larger, and had contact with Natural Resources and 
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In recent years, incentive programs have been used in the agricultural sector to 
promote the use of environmentally friendly management practices to conserve the 
environment. The incentive program of importance to this study is the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). The EQIP entails the payment of government 
subsidies to landowners who implement specific conservation practices. The program 
uses two types of payments:  (1) cost-sharing, which applies to structural and vegetative 
practices and covers a maximum of 90% of the cost of implementation for limited 
resource or beginning producers and 75% for others, and/or (2) an incentive payment 
that is made to producers to encourage them to adopt land management practices they 
may not otherwise have adopted. The EQIP offers five to ten year contracts. 
The EQIP works together with other federal conservation programs that 
generate environmental benefits, some of which are the Conservation Reserve Program, 
the Wetlands Reserve Program, and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program. The EQIP 
is the only USDA conservation program that contains an explicit clause targeting funds 
to address environmental concerns arising from livestock production. Nationally, at 
least 50% of EQIP funds must be used for natural resource concerns related to 
livestock. Over the years of its term, the 2002 farm bill significantly increases EQIP 
funding. In 2002, funding was at $400 million; in 2003, it increased to $700 million; 
and by 2004, it rose to $1 billion per year. The bill also removed the limit on the 
eligibility for larger operators to receive cost-share funds for animal waste management 
facilities. This was to enable larger operators to comply with new Environmental 
Protection Agency rules.  The question now is, are most farmers aware of the EQIP program, and if so, have they applied for EQIP funding?  This study addresses this 
question. 
It can be observed from Figures 1 and 2 that an increase in the cost of 
production associated with adoption of some conservation practices could increase total 
cost, TC, as well as average total cost (ATC) and marginal cost (MC) in the short run.  
If the market price for cattle is represented as P, as would be the case in a purely 
competitive industry, then additional short-run costs may lead to total costs exceeding 
total revenue.  With the help of EQIP, farmers would be partially compensated for the 
additional expenses involved in implementing conservation practices, thus helping 
them to remain in business while implementing BMPs. 
The objectives of this study are to: (1) determine the portions of cattle producers 
who: (a) have no knowledge of EQIP; (b) know of EQIP but have not applied to the 
program; (c) know of EQIP and have applied, but have not been accepted for funding; 
(d) know of EQIP, have applied, have been accepted, and have received the payments; 
and (e) know of EQIP, have applied and been accepted, but cancelled the contract later; 
and (2) determine the types of producers who fall into each of these categories.  
Literature Review 
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution remains a major policy challenge, with 
obstacles that arise from asymmetric information. The ability to measure producer 
response to policies requires empirical knowledge of the production function, the 
impact of inputs used on the environment and the risk attitude of producers. Peterson 
and Boisvert proposed a model to accommodate asymmetric information on farmer 
preferences and hidden information on technology types and input use in designing voluntary environmental policies. Results suggested that participation incentives would 
be inadequate for many risk-averse producers if the government did not account for 
diversity in risk preferences. 
Kilkenny and Huffman examined who was most likely to participate in welfare 
programs and in the labor force. They compared rural and urban residents. The 
variables used in the analysis were household composition, capital, labor market 
conditions and state-specific regulations. Results indicated that the rural poor in the 
Midwestern U.S. participated more in the labor force and less in the welfare programs 
than the urban poor. 
A number of studies have analyzed the adoption of conservation practices, 
though they have not addressed producers’ knowledge of programs designed to inform 
producers about the programs.  Examples include Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, Kim, and 
Cardona.  These studies generally examine the impact of farm type, demographic 
variables, financial variables, and other factors on the adoption of conservation 
practices.  
Data and Methods 
  During Summer, 2003, 1,500 cattle producers in Louisiana were surveyed to 
determine their knowledge of EQIP, adoption of conservation practices, and 
willingness to accept EQIP cost-share payments for the adoption of rotational grazing.  
The stratified sample included farmers with less than 20 animals (26.7%), 20-49 
animals (23.3%), 50-99 animals (23.3%), and 100 or more animals (26.7%).  An initial 
questionnaire was sent to the producers, followed by a postcard reminder two weeks 
later, and followed by a second questionnaire two weeks after the postcard.  Guidelines provided by Dillman for maximizing return rate were considered.  The overall return 
rate was 41%. 
A multinomial logit model is employed to analyze the impact of independent 
variables on farmers’ knowledge and use of EQIP.  It is a commonly applied model to 
explain and forecast discrete choice due to its ease of estimation and foundation in 
utility theory. Examples of studies carried out using the multinomial logit model are 
Coble et al., Herriges and Phaneuf, and Shwabe et. al.  See Greene for a full discussion 
of the multinomial logit model. 
In this study, four alternatives are considered.  Farmers either:  (1) have no 
knowledge of EQIP, (2) have knowledge of EQIP but have not applied for EQIP funds, 
(3) have knowledge of EQIP, have applied for funds, but have not received any 
payments, or (4) have knowledge of EQIP, have applied for funds, and have received 
payments. The multinomial logit model analyzes the impact of 10 independent 
variables on the state in which each of the producers falls.  These independent variables 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
It is expected that producers with greater numbers of cattle are aware of EQIP 
and are more likely to have adopted conservation practices under EQIP.  Previous 
studies have shown larger producers to be the greater adopters of technology of most 
types, including conservation practices (e.g., Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, Cardona).  
Thus, number of cattle, NCATTLE, (divided by 100 for estimation purposes) is 
included as a continuous variable.   
The production of purebred animals is included to determine whether there are 
differences in knowledge of EQIP and subsequent adoption of conservation practices between commercial and purebred producers.  PURSEED is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the farmer raises purebred animals.  
It is expected that producers who own a greater percentage of the land for their 
cattle operation are more likely to be informed of EQIP and to have applied for EQIP 
funds.  Producers who own a greater portion of their land are likely to have greater 
interest in conservation practices that lead to long-run productivity, and are more likely 
to be interested in entering programs through which the benefits accrue directly to the 
landowner.  Thus, LOWNED, the percentage of land owned by the farmer, is included. 
 Dummy variable NRCS indicates whether a farmer has met with Natural 
Resource Conservation Service personnel at least once in the past year. NRCS has the 
major responsibility for dissemination of information on EQIP; thus, farmers who have 
been in contact with NRCS are more likely to have heard about it and, subsequently, to 
have adopted conservation practices using EQIP. 
Farmers who have streams running through their farms have land that is at 
greater risk of runoff and pollution of streams.  Thus, dummy variable, RUNSTRM, 
which indicates whether a stream flows through the farm, is expected to impact whether 
farmers adopt conservation practices via EQIP.    
NAGE is the age of the farmer, divided by 10 for estimation purposes. Age is 
often used in technology adoption studies, with results frequently showing negative 
impacts on adoption (e.g., Brox et al., Kilkenny and Huffman, Roberts). It is 
hypothesized that older farmers are less likely to be aware of the EQIP and 
subsequently less likely to adopt conservation practices.   COLLEGE is a dummy variable that indicates the farmer holds a Bachelor’s 
degree. COLLEGE is hypothesized to positively influence awareness of EQIP and 
subsequent adoption of conservation practices, as more educated farmers are generally 
more likely to be informed of programs and technology.  
Farmers with a higher percentage of household net income from the beef 
operation are hypothesized to have a greater knowledge of EQIP, as well as a greater 
adoption of conservation practices using EQIP. PBEEFINC is the percentage of 
household net income from the beef operation.  
More diversified farmers are expected to have greater awareness of EQIP and to 
be greater subsequent adopters of conservation practices under the program.  DIVERSE 
represents the number of enterprises other than cattle on the farm.  Farmers with greater 
numbers of enterprises are more likely to have utilized EQIP, since they may have 
adopted conservation practices for another enterprise using the program.   
FARMTAKOV is a dummy variable indicating whether a member of the 
farmer’s family plans to take over the farm operation after the farmer’s retirement. 
FARMTAKOV is hypothesized to positively impact farmers’ knowledge of EQIP, as 
well as subsequent adoption of conservation practices under EQIP.  Having a family 
member to take over the operation may effectively extend the farmer’s planning 
horizon. 
Results 
Results indicate that about 51% of the producers were aware of the EQIP.  Of 
these, 55% had applied for EQIP funds.  Of those who had applied, 74% had received the EQIP funds.  Of those who had received the funds, 9% later broke the EQIP 
contract.   
Having 100 additional cattle in the operation increased the probability of having 
applied for EQIP funds but not receiving the payments by 0.007.  NRCS greatly 
influenced awareness of EQIP and subsequent adoption of BMPs under EQIP, as 
expected.  Contact with NRCS reduced the probability of never having heard of EQIP 
by 0.34, increased the probability of having applied for EQIP funds, but not receiving 
payments by 0.05, and increased the probability of having applied for EQIP funds, 
being accepted, and subsequently adopting by 0.29.  Thus, the increased probability 
associated with receiving the funds if applied for was greater than the increased 
probability associated with not receiving funds if applied for. 
Having a greater percentage of income from the beef enterprise increased the 
probability of having heard of EQIP but not applying for funds, and having heard of 
EQIP, applying, but not receiving payments.  Diversification was highly associated 
with EQIP awareness and subsequent BMP adoption.  An additional enterprise reduced 
the probability of never having heard of EQIP by 0.06, increased the probability of 
having heard of EQIP but not applying for funds by 0.04, and increased the probability 
of having heard of EQIP and applying for funds but not receiving them by 0.02.   
Having a family member to take over the operation upon the farmer’s retirement 
increased the probability of having applied for EQIP but not receiving payments by 
0.04, and surprisingly decreased the probability of having applied for EQIP, being 
accepted, and implementing the practice by 0.11.   Variables PURSEED, LOWNED RUNSTRM, NAGE, and COLLEGE were not 
found to influence knowledge of EQIP or the subsequent adoption decision.  These 
variables had been significant in some of the previous probit models assessing the 
adoption of individual conservation practices (Kim).  In some cases, the variables 
increased adoption, while in others, they decreased adoption;  thus, when placed into 
the context of a count data model, it is not surprising that they would not be significant.   
Conclusions 
This research indicates that interaction with NRCS has the greatest influence on 
whether producers have heard of EQIP and whether they will subsequently adopt 
conservation practices.  Thus, if society wishes to have producers adopt conservation 
practices, funding of educational efforts via NRCS is likely to be an effective way to 
meet this end.   
Other results support previous research that has shown larger, diversified 
producers who receive a greater amount of their income from the enterprise to be the 
more informed producers of agricultural programs, as well as the greater adopters of 
conservation practices. Thus, if greater adoption rates of conservation practices are 
desired, then smaller, specialized, part-time farmers might be targeted.  It is, however, 
acknowledged that these producers constitute a disproportionately small percentage of 
the cattle produced, and their current production practices may not be considered to be 
“intensive” in nature, with potentially low grazing rates, etc. 
The difficulties encountered in this research are mainly with the model used in 
the analysis.  The multinomial logit model assumes independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, which may not be an appropriate assumption in our case.  As this research continues, we hope to further analyze the problem using models that may relax this 
assumption, such as the nested logit model. There is also the need to apply this study to 
other regions to verify how well producers are aware of the EQIP program and the 
adoption of conservation practices. 
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 Table 1.  Marginal Effects of the Multinomial Logit Model. 
Y=0:  Have Never Heard of EQIP. 
x-VARIABLES  COEFFICIENTS  STANDARD ERROR 
P-
VALUE 
NCATTLE  -0.164*10-1  0.159*10-1  0.302 
PURSEED  -0.112  0.781*10-1  0.150 
LOWNED  -0.340*10-1  0.769*10-1  0.658 
NRCS  -0.341  0.553*10-1  0.000 
RUNSTRM  0.143*10-1  0.564*10-1  0.800 
NAGE  -0.190*10-1  0.229*10-1  0.408 
COLLEGE  0.346*10-1  0.606*10-1  0.568 
PBEEFINC  0.662*10-3  0.366*10-1  0.986 
DIVERSE  -0.603*10-1  0.277*10-1  0.029 
FAMTAKOV  0.623*10-1  0.625*10-1  0.319 
 
Y=1:  Have Heard of EQIP but Have Never Applied. 
x-VARIABLES  COEFFICIENTS  STANDARD ERROR  P-VALUE 
NCATTLE  -0.672*10-2  0.135*10-1  0.618 
PURSEED  0.383*10-1  0.631*10-1  0.544 
LOWNED  0.889*10-3  0.652*10-1  0.989 
NRCS  0.885*10-3  0.431*10-1  0.984 
RUNSTRM  0.699*10-1  0.469*10-1  0.136 
NAGE  -0.154*10-2  0.193*10-1  0.936 
COLLEGE  0.500*10-1  0.499*10-1  0.316 
PBEEFINC  0.578*10-1  0.273*10-1  0.034 
DIVERSE  0.398*10-1  0.215*10-1  0.063 








 Table 1. Continued. 
Y=2:  Have Heard of EQIP, Have Applied, but Have Not Received Funds. 
x-VARIABLES  COEFFICIENTS  STANDARD ERROR  P-VALUE 
NCATTLE  0.744*10-2  0.374*10-2  0.047 
PURSEED  0.338*10-1  0.234*10-1  0.149 
LOWNED  -0.177*10-1  0.285*10-1    0.536 
NRCS  0.483*10-1  0.176*10-1    0.006 
RUNSTRM  -0.238*10-1  0.206*10-1    0.247 
NAGE  0.754*10-3  0.852*10-2    0.929 
COLLEGE  0.825*10-3  0.212*10-1    0.969 
PBEEFINC  -0.324*10-1  0.186*10-1    0.081 
DIVERSE  0.209*10-1  0.784*10-2    0.007 
FAMTAKOV  0.362*10-1  0.199*10-1    0.069 
 
Y=3:  Have Heard of EQIP, Have Applied, and Have Received Funds. 
x-VARIABLES  COEFFICIENTS  STANDARD ERROR  P-VALUE 
NCATTLE  0.157*10-1         
 
1.000*10-2  0.116 
PURSEED  0.402*10-1  0.550*10-1  0.464 
LOWNED  0.507*10-1  0.585*10-1  0.386 
NRCS  0.292  0.369*10-1  0.000 
RUNSTRM  -0.603*10-1  0.423*10-1  0.154 
NAGE  0.197*10-1  0.173*10-1  0.255 
COLLEGE  -0.162*10-1  0.432*10-1  0.707 
PBEEFINC  -0.261*10-1  0.281*10-1  0.353 
DIVERSE  -0.365*10-3  0.190*10-1  0.985 
FAMTAKOV  -0.11  0.479*10-1  0.021 
 